|本期目录/Table of Contents|

超越康德式理性主义——斯洛特情感主义德性伦理学的理论路径(PDF)

《内蒙古大学学报(社会科学版)》[ISSN:1000-9035/CN:22-1262/O4]

期数:
2019年06期
页码:
81-87
栏目:
哲学研究
出版日期:
2019-11-15

文章信息/Info

Title:
Going beyond Kantian Rationalism——The Theoretical Path of Slote’s Sentimentalist Virtue Ethics
作者:
张建霞
南开大学哲学院,天津 300350
Author(s):
ZHANG Jian-xia
School of Philosophy, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350,China
关键词:
迈克尔·斯洛特情感主义德性伦理学移情康德式理性主义
Keywords:
Michael Slote sentimentalist virtue ethics empathy Kantian rationalism
分类号:
-
DOI:
-
文献标识码:
A
摘要:
迈克尔·斯洛特是当今最激进、最坚定的情感主义德性伦理学家,他吸收并发展了休谟的情感主义和中国古代的儒家伦理思想,并将其与当代关怀伦理学和发展心理学的成果糅合在一起,构建了以移情为基础的情感主义德性伦理学体系,并以此来定位我们的正义观。斯洛特认为,情感和理性共同构成认知的基本元素,移情是人类基本的、普遍的情感。斯洛特的情感主义德性伦理学在道德判断、道德义务及社会正义方面导致了其与康德式理性主义的规范性分歧。他试图以一种情感主义的理路来超越理性主义伦理学在理论和实践方面的缺陷,为当代哲学提供一种新的进路。
Abstract:
Michael Slote is one of the most radical and determined sentimentalist virtue ethicists of today. He absorbed and developed Hume’s sentimentalist and the Confucian ethics in ancient China. He also mixed these with the fruits of contemporary care ethics and developmental psychology, and constructed a system of sentimentalist virtue ethics based on empathy. Then he measured the justice by the system. Slote believes that emotion and reason are the basic elements of cognition, and empathy is the basic and universal emotion of mankind. Slote’s sentimentalist virtue ethics leads to normative disagreement of Kantian rationalism in moral judgment, moral obligation, and social justice. He attempts to go beyond the defects of rationalism ethics by the path of sentimentalism, and provides a new approach to contemporary philosophy.

参考文献/References

[1]Michael Slote. Moral Sentimentalism[M]. Oxford: Oxford University Press,2010.
[2]〔美〕迈克尔·斯洛特.走向情感主义的德性伦理学[N].中国社会科学报,2014-10-27.
[3]韩玉胜.移情能作为普遍的道德基础吗——对斯洛特道德情感主义的分析与评论[J].哲学动态,2017(3).
[4]Marion Hourdequin. The Limits of Empathy[A].Tephen C. Angle, Michael Slote. Virtue Ethics and Confucianism[C]. London: Routledge,2013.
[5]John Rawls.A Theory of Justice[M].Cambridge: Harvard University Press.1999.
[6]〔德〕恩格斯.反杜林论[A].马克思恩格斯选集:第3卷[M].北京:人民出版社,1972.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2018-06-29
基金项目: 教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(项目批准号:14JZD004)
作者简介: 张建霞,女,河南商丘市人,南开大学哲学院,博士研究生。
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